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a misprint, because North Korea did not
invade South Korea until June 1950.
These items are minor and easily
corrected in a future edition. What
remains still is a powerful book that
goes into great detail, benefiting
from the storytelling ability of H. W.
Brands. We hope that a civil-military
conflict between a towering figure like
MacArthur and a sitting U.S. president
is unlikely to reoccur. Yet the story
remains a valid one today, with its lessons on the reach of military power in
a democracy, the role of the president
in setting national policy, and the role
of civilian oversight of military power.
DAVID L. TESKA

The Pacific War and Contingent Victory: Why
Japanese Defeat Was Not Inevitable, by Michael
W. Myers. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 2015.
208 pages. $34.95.

The Pacific War and Contingent Victory
is “an exercise in the elucidation of
terms”—an exercise necessary to
determine whether the Empire of
Japan could have avoided defeat at the
hands of the United States and its allies.
The focus on “terms” is important,
as precision and clarity are vital to
Professor Michael Myers’s effort to
challenge the near-universal acceptance
of the idea that Japanese defeat was
inevitable. On the contrary, Myers
argues that there were several points
in the war where the arc of history was
subject to change, given a different mix
of luck, skill, will, or strategy. Myers’s
book takes aim at British historian H.
P. Willmott—a leading proponent of
the inevitability school—and Willmott’s
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assertion that since “the defeat of
Japan was assured” no single battle or
campaign can be considered “decisive.”
The Pacific War and Contingent
Victory challenges this conventional
view that inherent industrial, financial,
and demographic shortcomings all
but guaranteed Japanese defeat.
Myers is also careful to argue that,
while the Japanese could have avoided
defeat, this does not mean necessarily
that they ultimately could have gained
victory. Rather, Japan might have
realized outcomes short of actual defeat,
such as an armistice preserving some
of the gains made early in the war, a
return to the status quo ante bellum, or
even a negotiated surrender that left
Japan more intact than it would be when
it ultimately did surrender in 1945.
Myers’s challenge to Willmott and the
rest of the proponents of inevitable
Japanese defeat is built on an insistence
on precise terms: as he explains, all that
is required is to show that there was the
slightest chance of a Japanese victory,
however long the odds or improbable
the required chain of events. If, even
under the most remote of conditions,
a different outcome could have occurred, then the inevitability argument
is defeated. Myers then argues that if
defeat was not a certainty, then one
or more events—be they battles or
campaigns or just a moment of good
or ill fortune—had to be decisive. It is
difficult, perhaps even impossible, to
argue with Myers’s logic. His position
is somewhat similar to that of a lawyer
defending the owners of a carnival who
offer a commonly found midway game
involving tossing softballs into milk cans
for prizes. All the lawyer has to do is
show that it is possible for the softball to
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go into the can, even if the likelihood of
that happening is as close to zero as one
can get, and no one ever wins a prize.
Myers produces ample evidence to prove
his point. He notes that even Willmott
himself acknowledges that a German
victory in Europe could have enabled
Japan to achieve something other than
defeat in the Pacific. If the avatar of
inevitability admits the possibility of
an alternative outcome, what else is
needed to carry the argument? However,
the clarification that Japanese defeat
was nearly inevitable versus simply
inevitable is a distinction without a
difference. If this were all there was to
Myers’s book, it would be scant reward
for the cost of purchase or the time
spent reading it. Luckily there is more.

Japan might have avoided defeat.
These include a United States willing
to settle for a negotiated conclusion
in the face of mounting casualties
and war weariness. Greater success
against Australia, which Myers argues
could have been achieved, perhaps
combined with a successful invasion
and occupation of Hawaii, might have
been another means to a different end.
In sum, Myers’s book—which has
been used in the Naval War College’s
curricular case on the Pacific theater
in the Second World War—by focusing
on war’s contingent nature, illustrates
well the oft-noted maxim that in war
the enemy truly does “get a vote.”
RICHARD J. NORTON

The Pacific War and Contingent Victory
identifies a number of ways by which
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